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Morrill: Adverse Possession: The Three, Five and Ten Year Statutes of Limi

ADVERSE POSSESSION: THE THREE, FIVE, AND TEN
YEAR STATUTES OF LIMITATION
The purpose of adverse possession statutes is to quiet titles openly
and consistently asserted to land possessed without interruption and for

a given length of time.' 44 With very few exceptions, a claim of adverse

possession may be asserted by or against any individual or organization.
The class of those who may acquire limitation title includes corpora-

tions, 14 5 government bodies,"" minors,14 two or more persons acting
jointly, 4 8 persons without disabilities under the law,' 49 and persons
holding for another. 50 Correspondingly, all classes of landowners may
have adverse title asserted against them with the exception of government entities' and persons with certain disabilities. 5 2 The law provides that, based on the merits of his claim, the claimant may assert

adverse possession against the record owner under the 3, 5, or 10-year
statutes. 58

Assertion of title under each statute requires proof of

144. Republic Nat'l Bank v. Stetson, 390 S.W.2d 257, 262 (Tex. 1965); see Bordages
v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 129 S.W.2d 786, 791 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1938, writ
dism'd jdgmt cor.).
145. See Buchanan v. Houston & T.C.R.R., 180 S.W. 625, 627 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1915, no writ).
146. Stanley v. Schwalby, 162 U.S. 255, 272 (1896).
147. See Wier Lumber Co. v. Conn, 156 S.W. 276, 279 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston
1913, no writ).
148. Myers v. Frey, 102 Tex. 527, 529-30, 119 S.W. 1142, 1143-44 (1909); Henderson v. Goodwin, 368 S.W.2d 800, 803 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1963, no writ);
Anzaldua v. Richardson, 287 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1956, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
149. See Esterling v. Murphey, 11 S.W.2d 329, 332 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1928,
writ ref'd).
150. See Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Abraham, 209 S.W. 265, 267-68 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1919, no writ); Beaumont Wharf & Terminal Co. v. McFaddin, 178 S.W.
722, 723 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1915, writ ref'd).
151. Weatherly v. Jackson, 123 Tex. 213, 222, 71 S.W.2d 259, 264 (1934).
152. See discussion p. 105 inIra.
153. The 3-year statute, TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5507 (1958), requires that
the claimant assert title under a regular chain of transfers from or under the sovereign
of the soil or under color of title. Color of title, as defined by TEX. Ray. CIv. STAT.
ANN. art. 5508 (1958), is a consecutive chain of transfers which may lack regularity,
though such does not include the want of intrinsic fairness and honesty.
There are four requirements for acquiring title under the 5-year limitation statute,
TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5509 (1958): a claimant must be able to prove peaceable and adverse possession of the land; payment of taxes on the land; a claim under
deed or deeds; and recordation of the deed or deeds.
Under the 10-year statute, TEx. REv. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 5510 (1958), there are
three alternatives to proceed under a claim of right: a claim under a duly registered
memorandum of title (deed), actual enclosure (fencing), and mere entry onto the
premises, where the possession is limited to 160 acres. The 10-year statute does not
require showing the payment of taxes.
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peaceable and adverse possession, as defined in articles 5514 and
5515.154
Adverse possession is actual possession commenced and continued
under a claim of right, hostile and exclusive to all, continuously asserted, and not interrupted for the statutory period. 55 The principal
issue in proving a hostile and exclusive claim of right is whether the

claimant's acts or declarations were sufficient to give the owner notice
of the claim asserted."

6

Any prior relationships with the owner or

owners, such as cotenancy or a landlord-tenant relationship, must be
clearly repudiated by the claimant. 15 7 The statutory period commences upon notice to the owner, provided that at that time he could
have maintained a cause of action to recover the land. 5 ' The most
difficult burden on the claimant is the requirement of proving by clear
and satisfactory evidence that peaceable and adverse possession was asserted continuously by or for him during the statutory period. 15 9 The

claimant must show that peaceable and adverse possession was uninterrupted either by his own acts or by those of the record owner.' 60 A
1,54. "Peaceable possession" is such as is continuous and not interrupted by adverse
suit to recover the estate. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5514 (1958). "Adverse possession" is an actual and visible appropriation of the land, commenced and continued
under a claim of right inconsistent with and hostile to the claim of another. TEx. REV.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5515 (1958).
155. Rick v. Grubbs, 147 Tex. 267, 269, 214 S.W.2d 925, 926 (1948); see Killough
v. Hinds, 161 Tex. 178, 180, 338 S.W.2d 707, 710 (1960); Pearson v. Doherty, 143 Tex.
64, 71, 183 S.W.2d 453, 456 (1944); Lundelius v. Thompson, 461 S.W.2d 153, 160
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
156. Where the claimant verbally asserts adverse possession against the true owner,
he is said to have given actual notice. In absence of actual notice, the claimant's possessory acts must be of such an open and visible nature that constructive notice may
be found. The central issue in adverse possession is quite often whether there was constructive notice. Porter v. Wilson, 389 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. 1965). For example, the acts
of planting flowers, trimming grass, keeping the tract clean, as the holder had, did not
give actual or constructive notice. Miller v. Fitzpatrick, 418 S.W.2d 884, 890 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In a more recent case, the court found
that the acts of plowing and gardening the disputed tract and construction of an outhouse and chicken-house thereon, were such compelling circumstances as to give the
owner "constructive" notice of adverse claim. Gilbreath v. Yarborough, 472 S.W.2d
185, 188, 189 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
157. Calverley v. Gunstream, 497 S.W.2d 110, 115 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); see Roosevelt v. Davis, 49 Tex. 463, 473 (1878).
158. See Alamo Lumber Co. v. Guajardo, 315 S.W.2d 672, 677 (Tex. Civ. App.Eastland), afI'd, 159 Tex. 225, 317 S.W.2d 725 (1959).
159. See Balli v. McManus, 311 S.W.2d 933, 937 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1958, writ refd n.r.e.); Howell v. Garlington, 270 S.W. 269, 271 (Tex. Civ. App.Beaumont 1925, no writ).
160. See Bruni v. Vidaurri, 140 Tex. 138, 166 S.W.2d 81 (1942); Cobb v. Robertson,
99 Tex. 138, 147, 86 S.W. 746, 749 (1905); Ballingall v. Brown, 226 S.W.2d 165, 168,
169 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1949, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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showing of continuous peaceable and adverse possession satisfies the
basic requirement for the successful assertion of a claim of title by adverse possession, but the claimant must also meet the additional special
requirements of the applicable limitation statute.
The possession must be hostile and exclusive and must include notice to the record owner of a claim of right, the intent of the claimant
to claim the land as his own.'
The claim may be made verbally, and,
thus, constitute actual notice to the owner. Without actual notice the
claimant must act so openly and visibly in his possession of the land
that the owner's knowledge of the claim will be presumed, thus constituting constructive notice. 6 2 The circumstances of possession and
any relationship between the owner and the claimant combine to produce the necessary notice, after which the limitation period begins to
run. Between strangers the limitation period may commence upon
entry on the premises since the claimant's exclusive possession cannot
be reconciled with the rights of the record owner and is, therefore, suf1 63
ficient notice of adverse possession.
One situation in which the relationship between the owner and the
claimant is important, however, is in a shared ownership. When a coowner of property attempts to claim the property entirely as his own
through adverse possession, the notice requirement is necessarily very
stringent, requiring a repudiation by the claimant of the co-ownership.' 64 The repudiation must be clearly indicated to the other coowners, either expressly or by acts which are so visible, notorious, distinct, and hostile that notice will be presumed.' 65
The most common example of a shared ownership situation is a cotenancy. The cotenant-claimant must clearly repudiate the shared title
and this must be "brought home" to each of the other cotenants.' 6 0
161. Orsbom v. Deep Rock Oil Corp., 153 Tex. 281, 290, 267 S.W.2d 781, 787
(1954); Burnett v. Knight, 428 S.W.2d 470, 472 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1968, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
162. Orsborn v. Deep Rock Oil Corp., 153 Tex. 281, 291, 267 S.W.2d 781, 787
(1954); Hoppe v. Sauter, 416 S.W.2d 912, 914 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1967, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); see Houston Oil Co. v. Jones, 109 Tex. 89, 90, 198 S.W. 290 (Tex. 1917).
163. Hickman v. Ferguson, 164 S.W. 1085, 1087 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914, writ ref'd).
"Strangers" are parties having no previous interest in the land. Id. at 1087.
164. Poenisch v. Quarnstrom, 361 S.W.2d 367, 370 (Tex. 1962).
165. In Rio Bravo Oil Co. v. Hunt Petroleum Corp., 455 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. 1970),

the record owner's predecessors in title conveyed a right-of-way to the railroad whereupon the railroad leased portions of the owner's land for agricultural purposes and
fenced certain portions. The court held there was no clear repudiation of owner's title,
as such operations by the railroad were permitted by statute. Id. at 727; see Poenisch
v. Quarnstrom, 361 S.W.2d 367, 370 (Tex. 1962).
166. Walton v. Hardy, 401 S.W.2d 614, 616 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1966, writ ref'd
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The proof of repudiation is purposefully stringent to prevent situations

in which one tenant who actually controls the land might claim exclusive title by adverse possession without giving prior notice to the other
family members.' 67 Although notice of repudiation is a question of
fact, the courts do not seem inclined to relax the stringency of proof

required to show repudiation as between cotenants. 161 One possible
exception arises when a cotenant attempts to convey the entire tract,
as distinguished from his own undivided interest, to a stranger. This
results in a repudiation of the cotenancy and the grantee may, by taking
possession and performing the required acts, acquire title to the
whole.'" 9

Another situation in which the relationship between the claimant and
owner is important involves subordinate relationships. If the claimant
possesses the land in subordination to another, as in a landlord-tenant
relationship, the claimant must repudiate the tenancy before the limitation period will commence.1 70 Repudiation consists of acts which are

of "unequivocal notoriety" and proof merely of notice is insufficient.' 7 '

The strict burden on the claimant protects the landlord in his reli-

ance on the tenancy relationship, and properly requires the tenant to
prove repudiation.
A second subordinate relationship situation arises when a grantor
remains in possession and attempts to assert adverse possession against
his grantee. Such continued possession is held to be in subordination
to the grantee, absent repudiation of the subordinate nature of the
grantor's possessory interest. 7 2 The grantee under these circumn.r.e.); see Poenisch v. Quarnstrom, 361 S.W.2d 367, 370 (Tex. 1962).
167. Todd v. Bruner, 365 S.W.2d 155, 159-60 (Tex. 1963); Poenisch v. Quarnstrom,
361 S.W.2d 367, 370, (Tex. 1962); see Smith v. Temple Indus., 485 S.W.2d 605, 607
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1972, no writ).
168. See Todd v. Bruner, 365 S.W.2d 155, 159-60 (Tex. 1963).
169. Gossett v. Tidewater Associated Oil Co., 436 S.W.2d 416, 420-21 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Page v. Pan American Petroleum Co., 327 S.W.2d
469, 471 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1959, writ refd n.r.e.); Parr v. Ratisseau, 236 S.W.2d
503, 506 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1951, writ ref'd n.r.e.). For the effect of a
cotenant's conveyance of his undivided interest see Meaders v. Moore, 134 Tex. 127,
133-34, 132 S.W.2d 256, 259 (1939).
170. Killough v. Hinds, 161 Tex. 178, 183, 338 S.W.2d 707, 711 (1960); Archille
v. Baird, 361 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see
Sweeten v. Park, 154 Tex. 256, 259, 276 S.W.2d 794, 797 (1955); Tyler v. Davis, 61
Tex. 674, 676 (1884); Baten v. Price, 489 S.W.2d 931, 932 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1972, no writ).
171. ArchiUle v. Baird, 361 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1962, writ
refd n.r.e.).
172. Toscano v. Delgado, 506 S.W.2d 317, 320 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974,
no writ). Where the grantor is divested of title by judgment, his continued possession

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol7/iss1/6

4

Morrill: Adverse Possession: The Three, Five and Ten Year Statutes of Limi

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 7:58

stances may presume that the grantor recognizes superior title in him
so that actual possession by the grantee becomes unnecessary. 173 Because of this relationship the burden is on the claimant-grantor to prove
the necessary repudiation.
Once the period of limitation has begun, the peaceable and adverse

possession asserted must be continuous. 17 The burden of showing
continuous possession insures that the record owner must, at some time,
have had notice of the adverse claim. 71 If the claimant can prove
that all elements of peaceable and adverse possession continued for the
statutory period, and additionally proves that the special requirements
of the particular statute asserted have been met, then he has satisfied

the requirements of a legal claim.' 76 The proof of continuous possession must be clear and satisfactory, although the particular evidence re77
quired varies with the nature and circumstances of each case.
In order to establish continuous possession for the requisite number
of years the claimant may tack his own possession to that of previous

occupants.17 8 The prior occupant's possession, however, must also
have been peaceable and adverse. 1 79 For example, an adverse claimant may transfer his claimed interest in the property to another, and

the subsequent grantee may, in computing his years of adverse possession, include all the time which the original claimant adversely possessed the land. The essential element in the transfer of the claim is the
passage of possession by mutual consent without abandonment of the

claim; a paper transfer is not necessary.'8 0 If, however, a deed is not

is considered a tenancy at will or tenancy at sufferance. Steed v. Barefield, 348 S.W.2d
205, 207 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
173. Evans v. Templeton, 69 Tex. 375, 378, 6 S.W. 843, 844 (Tex. 1887); see Jackson v. Genecov, 471 S.W.2d 589, 593 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.),
in which the court held that the grantor's continued possession of the tract was considered at best a tenancy at sufferance or tenancy at will. The court noted that even where
the previous owner had executed an oil lease on the tract, there was no repudiation absent a showing of grantee's 'knowledge of such instrument. Id. at 593.
174. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5514 (1958).
175. See generally Hooper v. Acuff, 159 S.W. 934, 935 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1913, no writ).
176. See Balli v. McManus, 311 S.W.2d 933, 937 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1958, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Howell v. Garlington, 270 S.W. 269, 270 (Tex. Civ. App.Beaumont 1925, no writ).
177. See Howell v. Garlington, 270 S.W. 269, 270 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1925,
no writ).
178. Odem v. Leahy, 264 S.W. 218, 219 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1924, no
writ).
179. Hardeman v. Mitchell, 444 S.W.2d 651, 655 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1969, no
writ); see Miller v. Gist, 91 Tex. 335, 340-41, 43 S.W. 263, 265 (1897).
180. Compare Whittle v. Johnston, 392 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.) with Sterling v. Tarvin, 456 S.W.2d 529, 534-35 (Tex. Civ.
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used to show the succession, then proof of the actual transfer of possession is required.""' The required continuous claim of right may be lost
or interrupted by the claimant's own acts or by the acts of others.' 2
The claimant may lose his claim of right by abandoning it, or he may
interrupt it by recognizing the superior title of the owner."'
There is, however, no requirement that the claimant remain in constant possession of the tract claimed, so long as any vacancies or absences are of such short duration that a reasonably prudent person
would not assume that the claim had been abandoned.' 4 The burden
is on the claimant to prove that any vacancy was merely "temporary"
and not unreasonable.18 5 If the adverse claimant possesses the land
through tenants holding under him, a period of temporary vacancy is
also allowed for the changing of tenants. 8 6 The temporary vacancy
rule has been applied under the 5 and 10-year statutes requiring continuous cultivation and use of the disputed tract for the required period.
A distinction, however, is to be drawn between seasonal cultivation and
seasonal use. If the tract is cultivated by the claimant during each year
of the statutory period, his possession is continuous even though there
may be a lapse of occupancy between seasons.1s 7 On the other hand,
occasional use will not suffice.' s Even regular and consistent use of
the land for each year of the statutory period is insufficient if there
89
are also substantial periods of nonuse.
App.-Fort Worth 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See generally McAnally v. Texas Co., 124
Tex. 196, 204-205, 76 S.W.2d 997, 1001 (1934).
181. McAnally v. Texas Co., 127 Tex. 196, 198, 76 S.W.2d 997, 1002 (1934); Brown
v. Dorough, 224 S.W.2d 752, 754 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1954, writ ref'd); Abramson
v. Sullivan, 103 S.W.2d 229, 231, 232 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1937, no writ).
182. See Bruni v. Vidaurri, 140 Tex. 138, 147-48, 166 S.W.2d 81, 87 (1942); Cobb

v. Robertson, 99 Tex. 138, 147, 86 S.W. 746, 749 (1905); Ballingall v. Brown, 226
S.W.2d 165, 168, 169 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1949, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
- 183. Bruni v. Vidaurri, 140 Tex. 138, 147-48, 166 S.W.2d 81, 87 (1942); see Butler

v. Hanson, 455 S.W.2d 942, 946 (Tex. 1970).
184. Wickizer v. Williams, 173 S.W. 1162 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1915, writ ref'd);
see Hankamer v. Sumrall, 257 S.W.2d 827, 830 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 19.53, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
185. Vaughan v. Anderson, 495 S.W.2d 327, 332-33 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana

1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (conclusions such as "we retook possession" not sufficient to
prove continuous holding).

186. A 5-months vacancy between change of tenants was held to be reasonable in
Hardy v. Bumpstead, 41 S.W.2d 226, 227 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1931, jdgmt adopted).
A year, however, may be too long if the land is unoccupied and uncultivated. Stevens
v. Pedregon, 106 Tex. 576, 579, 173 S.W. 210, 211 (1915).
187. Hardy v. Bumpstead, 41 S.W.2d 226, 227 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1931, jdgmt
adopted).
188. Crosby v. Davis, 421 S.W.2d 138, 143 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1967, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Hutcheson v. Chandler, 104 S.W. 434, 435 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907, no writ).
189. Vaughan v. Anderson, 495 S.W.2d 327, 332 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1973,
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As a general rule, if the claimant gives some recognition of the
owner's title, then his adverse possession is interrupted. 190 The offer
to purchase title from the record owner may constitute recognition of
superior title sufficient to interrupt the statutory period,' depending
on whether the offer was made merely as an attempt to strengthen
the claimant's position by quieting title, or whether it was an acknowledgment of title in the record owner. 92 The purchase of an undivided
interest by the claimant does not, as a matter of law, constitute recognition of outstanding title as long as the claimant continues to openly and
consistently assert limitation title during the transaction. 193 A circumstance strongly considered is whether the recognition was of one who
had an actual interest in the land. In Patten v. Rogers' the supreme
court held the claimant's recognition of title in persons not having a
property interest in the land was not sufficient to interrupt the running
of the statutory period.' 95 In Patten the record owners had promised
to give their attorneys an undivided interest in any land recovered from
trespassers. The claimant thereafter transferred his interest in the land
in question by quitclaim to the attorney, stating in the quitclaim that
he had not held adversely as to the attorney. The statement was not
held to have constituted recognition of title since the attorney's interest
had not vested at the time the quitclaim was given. 9 6
A tenant holding under an adverse claimant may also recognize title
in the true owner, thus defeating the claim of adverse possession:
when the tenant of the claimant, in good faith and without notice, attorms to the owner of record, this breaks the claimant's continuity of
possession. 97 Attornment to a third party under the same circumwrit ref'd n.r.e.). Although claimant used beach lots as part of a concession business
for 6 months out of the year, the court held that this was not sufficient to raise a fact
issue as to notice of adverse possession to the owners. Winchester v. Porretto, 432
S.W.2d 170, 175 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston i[1st Dist.] 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
190. Ballingall v. Brown, 226 S.W.2d 165, 168-69 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1949, writ ref'd n.r.e.). For example, the taking of a lease from or paying rent to the

owner is sufficient recognition of title. Thurmond v. Trammell, 28 Tex. 372 (1866).
191.

Bruni v. Vidaurri, 140 Tex. 138, 147-48, 166 S.W.2d 81, 87 (1942); Meaders

v. Moore, 134 Tex. 127, 133, 132 S.W.2d 256, 259 (1939).
sented.

A question of fact is pre-

192. Meaders v. Moore, 134 Tex. 127, 133, 132 S.W.2d 256, 259 (1939).

If the

claimant expressly concedes that title is in the record owner when he makes the offer,
this concession is a sufficient recognition of superior title. Id. at 133, 132 S.W.2d at
259.
193. Id. at 134, 132 S.W.2d at 260.
194. 430 S.W.2d 479 (Tex. 1968).
195. Id. at 482.
196. Id. at 482.
197. Powell Lumber Co. v. Nobles, 44 S.W.2d 774, 777 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
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stances, however, is ineffective to render the tenant's continued posses-

sion adverse to the landlord. 198

Even if the claimant does not abandon his claim and does not recognize superior title in the owner, the owner may interrupt the claimant's

continuous possession by obtaining a judgment against the claim' 9 9 or
by entering the premises.2"' The running of the limitation period is
stopped as of the filing of the petition, even though the claimant may
continue in actual possession of the land. The suit against the claimant
must be prosecuted to a final judgment, however, if it is dismissed for
a lack of prosecution or abandoned, it has the effect of having never
been instituted.2 1

In a suit against multiple claimants, the owners

must secure a judgment against all to stop the running of the limita-

tion period.20 2 Therefore, the running of the statute is suspended
pending final judgment, 20 but if judgment is reached for the record
owner, the period is considered interrupted as of the date of the filing
of the petition.2 4

The second means by which the owner may interrupt possession is
by entering any part of the land in dispute. The entry must be open
and notorious and coupled with an intent to take and hold possession.105 The test applied is whether the owner's entrance to the dis-

puted tract would amount to an exclusion of use such that a reasonably
1931, no writ); Louisiana & Tex. Lumber Co. v. Alexander, 154 S.W. 233, 234 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Galveston 1913, no writ).
198. Hufstedler v. Barnett, 182 S.W.2d 504, 507 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1944,
writ ref'd w.o.m.).
199. Ballingall v. Brown, 226 S.W.2d 165, 168-69 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1949, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
200. Cobb v. Robertson, 99 Tex. 138, 147, 86 S.W. 746, 749 (1905); Sterling v.
Tarvin. 456 S.W.2d 529, 533 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1970,'writ ref'd n.r.e.); Col
lins v. Jones, 79 S.W.2d 175, 177-78 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1935, writ ref'd).
201. Gibbs v. Lester, 41 S.W.2d 28, 30 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1931, jdgmt adopted);
Poole v. Goode, 442 S.W.2d 810, 812-13 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1969,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
202. See Cobb v. Robertson, 99 Tex. 138, 139, 86 S.W. 746, 748 (1-905); Stovall v.
Carmichael, 52 Tex. 383, 389-90 (1880).
203. Gibbs v. Lester, 41 S.W.2d 28, 31 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1931, jdgmt adopted).
204. Poole v. Goode, 442 S.W.2d 810, 812-13 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The judgment of the justice of the peace court against the
claimants on a forcible entry and detainer suit was nullified when trial de novo was
sought in county court. The owner must again assume the burden of prosecuting the
case to a final judgment. Adams v. Slattery, 156 Tex. 433, 453, 295 S.W.2d 859, 872
(1956). The court notes that for interruption to occur, the suit must be prosecuted in
accordance with the due forms of law. Richards v. Smith, 67 Tex. 610, 612, 4 S.W.
571, 572 (Tex. 1887).
205. Kirby Lumber Corp. v. Smith, 305 S.W.2d 829, 830 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1957, writ dism'd).
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prudent man would realize that he had been ousted.20 6
Thus, the claimant should be aware that mere proof of continuous
possession is insufficient in light of abandonment or some form of interruption. When the claimant has established the basic requirement of
uninterrupted peaceable and adverse possession, the question then becomes how long he must maintain it and what additional requirements
exist under each of the adverse possession statutes.
3-YEAR STATUTE

The 3-year statute requires that the claim be established under
"title" or "color of title."2 °7 Under this statute the claimant is protected if he can trace his deed through each link in the title to the
sovereign.20 8 Generally, each link in the claimant's chain of title must
be regular, or sufficient on its face to form a purported conveyance and
constitute title. °9 Irregular transfers, however, so long as they are not
intrinsically unfair or dishonest, may form a sufficient basis of the
claimant's chain of title as "color of title."21 0 The claimant maintaining peaceable and adverse possession under title or color of title is
therefore protected from the grantees of prior sovereigns. 2 1 ' The statute permits the repose of title in favor of the possessor-claimant, although in priority of claim his is not the better right. 1 2
One hundred .and thirty years have passed since the statute was enacted, and, for the most part, the problems it sought to ameliorate no
longer exist.218 One of the principal drawbacks under the 3-year statute is that the claimant must prove, at least equitably, each link of a
regular chain of transfers.2 14 Proving links in the chain of title is stand206. American Nat'l Bank v. Wingate, 266 S.W.2d 934, 945 (Tex. Civ. App.Beaumont 1953, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
,
207. TEx. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5507 (1958).
208. Cole v. Grigsby, 35 S.W. 680, 686 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894), aII'd, 89 Tex. 223,
35 S.W. 792 (1896).
209. Burnham v. Hardy Oil Co., 108 Tex. 555, 562, 195 S.W. 1139, 1142 (1917);
Grigsby v. May, 84 Tex. 240, 248, 249, 19 S.W. 343, 345 (1892); Comment, The Texas
Three Year Statute, 19 TExAs L. REv. 375, 393-94 (1941).
210. Williamson v. Brown, 109 S.W. 412, 413 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908, writ dism'd).
The grant from the sovereign conveys only the right which the sovereign had at that
time. In Williamson, the land commissioner made an unauthorized conveyance of land
out of the public free school fund. The court held the grant void and insufficient to
convey even color of title. Id. at 413.
211. Comment, The Texas Three Year Statute, 19 TExAs L. REv. 375, 378 (1941).
212. Burnham v. Hardy, 108 Tex. 555, 562, 195 S.W. 1139, 1142 (1917).
213. See generally State v. Sais, 47 Tex. 307 (1877).
214. See Burnham v. Hardy Oil Co., 108 Tex. 555, 563-64, 195 S.W. 1139, 1143
(1917); State v. Sais, 47 Tex. 307 (1877); Comment, The Texas Three Year Statute,
19 TEXAs L. Rav. 375, 395 (1941).
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ard procedure in the law of conveyancing; the following have served

as links in the chain of title: undivided interests,21 claims under an
administrator's deed,2 16 a conveyance of a trustee in bankruptcy, 217 a
21 9
claim under a sheriff's deed, 21 8 a deed subject to a vendor's lien,
a tax deed, 22 0 a bond for title as against the heirs of obligor, 22 a quitclaim, 222 a claim under a will, 22 3 and a claim by inheritance. 224 While
these examples illustrate that links in a regular chain may be proven

in many ways, a claimant who is unable to show a regular chain may
alternatively attempt to prove links constituting color of title.
The irregular transfers which may qualify under color of title usually
involve mere errors of form rather than affronts to intrinsic fairness and
honesty.225 Color of title prohibits a claim under an intrinsically fradulent conveyance, such as a forged deed. 22 1 A conveyance valid between the grantor and grantee and fraudulent only as to third parties
is valid under the statute because fraud on third parties is extrinsic and

therefore not considered in determining limitation title. 27
A transfer from one who lacks the power to convey is not a muniment under the 3-year statute.228

Thus, one who lacks the legal au-

thority to transfer beneficial use cannot pass title or color of title under
215. Cole v. Grigsby, 35 S.W. 680, 686 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894), aff'd, 89 Tex. 223,
35 S.W. 792 (1896).
216. Sapp v. Newsom, 27 Tex. 537, 540, 541 (1864); Moseley v. Vander Stucken,
62 S.W. 1103, 1106 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901, writ ref'd).
217. Curdy v. Stafford, 88 Tex. 120, 124, 30 S.W. 551, 554 (1895).
218. Kennon v. Miller, 143 S.W. 986, 987 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1912, writ
ref'd).
219. Cocke v. Church, 23 S.W.2d 743, 744 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio), aff'd,
120 Tex. 262, 37 S.W.2d 723 (1929).
220. See Wehrly v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 64 S.W.2d 396, 401 (Tex. Civ. App.Galveston 1933, writ ref'd).
221. Downs v. Porter, 54 Tex. 59, 63 (1880).
222. Shaw v. Ball, 23 S.W.2d 291, 293-94 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1930, jdgmt adopted).
223. Charle v. Safford, 13 Tex. 94, 113 (1854).
224. Weaver v. Garrietty, 84 S.W.2d 878, 882 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1935, writ
ref'd); Williams v. Fuerstenberg, 12 S.W.2d 812, 816 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1928),
rev'd on other grounds, 23 S.W.2d 305 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1930, jdgmt adopted).
225. Seddon v. Harrison, 367 S.W.2d 888 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1963, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); see Veeder v. Gilmer, 103 Tex. 458, 461, 124 S.W. 595, 596 (1910); Pratt v.
Townsend, 125 S.W. 111, 114 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910, no writ).
See generally
Weatherred v. Kiker, 357 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
226. MacDonnell v. De Los Fuentes, 26 S.W. 792 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894, writ ref'd);
see Texas Land & Mortgage Co. v. State, 23 S.W. 258, 259 (Tex. Civ. App. 1892, writ
ref'd). See generally Neal v. Pickett, 280 S.W. 748, 750 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1926,
jdgmt adopted).
227. Neal v. Pickett, 280 S.W. 748, 752 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1926, jdgmt adopted);
see Hussey v. Moser, 70 Tex. 42, 47, 7 S.W. 606, 608 (1888).
228. See Burnham v. Hardy Oil Co., -108 Tex. 555, 563-64, 195 S.W. 1139, 1142
(1917).
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the 3-year limitation statute. 220 This point was illustrated in the supreme court case of Leyva v. Pacheco.23 ° In Leyva, the father had
purchased realty using the funds of his daughter. The father then conveyed the land to the son who pleaded a 3-year limitation title against
the daughter. The court found the son's claim was not supported by
title or color of title because the interest conveyed by the father to
the son was not that acquired from the sovereign in that beneficial interest was lacking. The transfer did not pass color of title because it
was intrinsically unfair to the daughter who owned the beneficial interest, and both father and son were aware of the fact.2 3'
Another situation in which the 3-year statute is applicable is in a
claim by a senior line grantee who fails to record before a subsequent
bona fide purchaser.2 32 The conveyance to the senior line grantee
consitutes color of title because it is valid between the parties and voidable only as to a third party bona fide purchaser. Therefore, if the
senior line grantee takes peaceable and adverse possession of the tract
2 33
for 3 years, he may perfect his title by limitation.
5-YEAR STATUTE

The most obvious difference between the 3 and 5-year statutes is
that the 5-year statute relaxes the substantial burden of proving title
from the sovereign. 2 4 The 5-year statute demands that the claimant
exercise normal incidents or acts of ownership over the realty, such as
a claim of right under a duly registered deed which has not been
forged, and the payment of taxes. 23 ' Mere peaceable and adverse possession is not enough;2 36 he must also cultivate, use, or enjoy the
229. Leyva v. Pacheco, 163 Tex. 638, 642-43, 358 S.W.2d 547, 550 (1962); District
Grand Lodge No. 25 v. Logan, 177 S.W.2d 813, 814-15 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth,
1943, writ refd).
230. 163 Tex. 638, 358 S.W.2d 547 (1962).
231. Id. at 642-43, 358 S.W.2d at 550.
232. Phelps v. Pecos Valley S. Ry., 182 S.W. 11.56, 1157 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso
1916, no writ). A senior line grantee situation is as follows: where X grantor conveys
to Y grantee, who does not record before X grantor conveys to Z grantee who purchases
for full value in good faith and without notice.
233. Id. at 1157-58.
234. Porter v. Chronister, 58 Tex. 53, 56 (1882); Castro v. Wurzbach, 13 Tex. 128,
131-32 (1854).
235. See Haring v. Shelton, 103 Tex. 10, 13, 122 S.W. 13, 14 (1909); Vaughan v.
Anderson, 495 S.W.2d 327, 331-32 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Crockett v. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co., 125 S.W.2d 1101, 1102 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1939, no writ).
236. Vaughan v. Anderson, 495 S.W.2d 327, 331-32 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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land.2"'
Finally, the claimant must show that all these elements
existed concurrently for 5 years.23 8
Before the 5-year statute may be successfully invoked the claimant
must show that he claims under a recorded deed. 239 The instrument

required by the statute should be valid on its face and should contain
an adequate description of the land. 24 ° Thus, those errors which do
not concern whether the deed is sufficient to give notice to the owner
or are not related to defining the claim usually will not defeat a claim

under a deed; however, an error such as lack of an acknowledgment

in the deed will defeat the claim. 241 In addition, an erroneous deed
description which cannot be corrected by construction is generally held
insufficient to apprise the true owner of the extent of the claim as-

serted, and thus will not support a claim. Examples of descriptive errors which have resulted in failure of claims include incorrectly cited
section 24 2 or abstract numbers 243 and misnomers in the names of locations.
The statute also provides that a forged deed, even if it appears valid
on its face, may not be used to qualify under the 5-year statute.2 4 The
fact of forgery, however, must be proved, and merely an affidavit
charging forgery will not nullify a deed which has all the appearances
of a regular deed.2 45
Once the claimant obtains a deed valid on its face which is not forged
or executed under a forged power of attorney, he is required to record

it.2" 6 This provides yet another means of giving notice to the true
237. TEx. Rnv. Cirv.

STAT. ANN.

art. 5509 (1958).

238. Love v. Magee, 378 S.W.2d 96, 99 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1964, writ ref d
n.r.e.); Taylor v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 295 S.W.2d 738, 744 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
239. See Haring v. Shelton, 103 Tex. 10, 13, 122 S.W. 13, 14 (1909).
240. Wofford v. McKinna, 23 Tex. 36, 43-44 (1859).
241. Carleton v. Lombardi, 81 Tex. 355, 358, 16 S.W. 1081, 1082 (1891); Callen
v. Collins, 120 S.W. 546, 549 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909, no writ). The defective acknowledgment prevented registration of the deed.
242. Broke v. McKechnie, 69 Tex. 32, 33, 6 S.W. 623, 624 (1887).
243. Hicks v. Southwestern Settlement & Dev. Corp., 214 S.W.2d 315, 318-19 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Beaumont 1948, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The question presented is whether the
descriptive error could have misled the true owner. W.D. Cleveland & Sons v. Smith,
156 S.W. 247, 251 (Tex. Civ. App.--Galveston 1913, writ ref'd).
244. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5509 (1958).
245. Crockett v. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co., 125 S.W.2d 1101, 1103 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1939, no writ); Todd v. Hand, 225 S.W. 770, 772 (Tex.Civ. App.Fort Worth 1920, writ ref'd). An affidavit alleging forgery is a demand for proof of
execution, not proof in itself, of forgery. Chamberlain v. Showalter, 23 S.W. 1017, 1019
(Tex. Civ. App. 1893,1 no writ).
246. The 5-year period commences upon registration of the deed and not before.
Van Sickle v. Catlett, 75 Tex. 404, 409, 13 S.W. 31, 32 (1889).
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owner of a claim against his land.24 7 If, for example, the duly registered deed through which the claimant asserts limitation title lacks adequate description but refers to another deed in the chain of title which
does adequately describe the disputed tract, then the other deed must
also be recorded.2 4 Thus, the act of recording overcomes an otherwise
fatal error in a claim under the 5-year statute. By requiring the existence of a formal deed, duly recorded, the purposes of giving the owner
due notice of the claim2 49 and adequately defining its boundaries,2 5
are accomplished.
Under the 5-year statute the claim is limited to the interest conveyed
by the deed. The claimant's possession of land outside the deed
description is unsupported, and no title may be acquired thereto under
the 5-year statute.
Furthermore, an adverse possessor's deed which
conveys to him only an undivided interest will not support a claim to
the whole tract under the statute. 2 51
The question of whether a quitclaim given to the adverse possessor
is sufficient as a deed under the 5-year statute has received much attention from the courts. The supreme court, in Porter v. Wilson,252 has
apparently resolved the matter by holding that a quitclaim does not pur25 3
port to convey land but conveys merely the grantor's current interest.
In Porter the plaintiff-claimant, having met the other requisites of the
5-year statute, attempted to prove limitation title based on a quitclaim.
The court determined that since a quitclaim is merely a relinquishment
of a doubtful claim, it may not give sufficient notice of the adverse
claim asserted against the owner.254
A deed valid on its face but later proven void does not defeat the
claim under the statute. Furthermore, the claim need not be made
in good faith. For example, a deed given to defraud creditors is sufficient under the 5-year statute.2 5 5 The fact that the conveyance could
247. Taylor v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 295 S.W.2d 738, 744 (Tex. Civ. App.Galveston 1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
248. McDonough v. Jefferson, 79 Tex. 535, 539, 15 S.W. 490, 491 (1891); Walker
v. Maynard, 31 S.W.2d 168, 170-71 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1930, no writ).
249. Taylor v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 295 S.W.2d 738, 744 (Tex. Civ. App.-Gal-

veston 1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

250. Larson, Limitations on Actions for Real Property: The Texas Five Year Statute,
18 Sw. L.J. 385, 391 (1964).
251. Porter v. Wilson, 389 S.W.2d 650, 654 (Tex. 1965); Martinez v. Bruni, 235

S.W. 549, 551 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1921, jdgmt adopted).
252. 389 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. 1965).

253. Id. at 657.
254. Id. at 657.
255. Hartman v. Hartman, 135 Tex. 596, 600, 138 S.W.2d 802, 803 (1940); Eckert
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be set aside by the judgment creditor25 6 is extrinsic to the parties to
the conveyance and therefore does not affect the usefulness of the deed
under the statute. Thus, a lienholder has no cause of action against
the claimant who receives title by defrauding the lienholder. The
judgment lienor, whose cause of action against the land would normally
continue for 10 years,2 57 may thereby be cut off by operation of the
5-year statute. 58 Adverse possession is, therefore, considered sufficient title to bar an action to recover the realty by a judgment creditor
when the adverse claim is based on a conveyance which is void as to
the judgment creditor.2 59
No deed in privity or recognition of the true owner's title will suffice
under the 5-year statute. A warranty deed, a sheriff's deed of sale,
and a tax deed are not within this category and are sufficient bases
on which to assert a claim. 260 Even in a situation where a grantor's
title has passed to his grantee by virtue of the doctrine of after-acquired title, the deed, although it does not vest any right to the property
in the grantor, may still be utilized as a basis of claim under the 5year statute. 6'
In addition to the requirements of a deed and of continuous adverse
possession it is also necessary that all taxes assessed against the property during the 5-year period must be promptly paid.26 2 The occupant
must also appropriate the land to some purpose for which it is adaptable
and which is sufficient to evidence his intent to appropriate.263 The
v. Wendel, 120 Tex. 618, 630, 40 S.W.2d 796, 801 (1931); Comment, Peculiaritiesof
the Five Year Statute, 9 BAYLOR L. REV. 338, 340 (1957).
256. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3996 (1966).
257. TEx. REV. Cv. STAT. ANN. art. 5449 (1958).
258. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5513 (1958).
259. See TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5509 (1958); Eckert v. Wendel, 120 Tex.
618, 40 S.W.2d 796 (1931).
260. Schleicher v. Gatlin, 85 Tex. 270, 274, 20 S.W.2d 120, 122 (1892); Bowles v.

Brice, 66 Tex. 724, 729-30, 2 S.W. 729, 732 (1886) (sheriff's sale); Bavousett v. Bradshaw, 332 S.W.2d 155, 157-58 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (tax
deed); Glasscock v. Dimmitt, 141 S.W. 822, 823 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1911, writ
ref'd) (warranty deed).
261. Daniels v. Jones, 450 S.W.2d 928, 932 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1970, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
262. Houston Oil Co. v. Jordan, 231 S.W. 320, 321 (Tex. Co mm'n App. 1921, jdgmt

adopted); Wichita Valley Ry. v. Somerville, 179 S.W. 671, 676 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1915, no writ).
263. Killough v. Hinds, 161 Tex. 178, 183, 338 S.W.2d 707, 710 (1960); Wright v.
Vernon Compress Co., 156 Tex. 474, 482, 296 S.W.2d 517, 522 (1957).

complete possession or use will not satisfy the statute.

Casual or in-

The following are examples of

casual or incomplete possession: (1) the storing of materials, (2) the erection and
maintenance of an advertising sign on the property, (3) the digging up of trees and

brush, (4) the filling in of property with dirt, (5) the use of an adjoining lot for ingress
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effect of the requirement of cultivation or use under the 5 and 10-year
statutes is to require some utilization of the land greater than mere actual or constructive possession.
10-YEAR

STATUTE

A comparison between the 5 and 10-year statutes shows that some
requirements under the 5-year statute, such as payment of taxes, are
supplanted under the 10-year statute by the longevity of the claim.2 6
In fact, a claim under a duly registered deed is but one possible claim
under the 10-year statute. The claimant may alternatively perfect limitation title under the 10-year statute by actual enclosure of the tract
claimed or by entering the premises with or without permission, and
staying the required 10 years. 2615 A claim taken by this method, however, is limited in area to 160 acres. Thus, the claimant who establishes continuous cultivation, use, or enjoyment for 10 years has met
virtually all the special requirements of the 10-year statute.2 66
A claimant under any of the possibilities in the 10-year statute may
utilize the concept of constructive adverse possession. Under this concept adequate use, cultivation, or enjoyment of only a portion of the
tract may support the adverse possessor's claim to the entire tract. 6
The courts have construed the 10-year statute as permitting a claim under a duly registered deed; 268 the rationale is that the claimant's actual
possession, coupled with cultivation, use, or enjoyment of any part of
the land described in the deed, should be sufficient to put the true
owner on notice of an adverse claim. The owner may then, by examination of the deed records, discover the extent of the claim.2 69 Under
the 10-year statute the extent of the claim is limited to the property
and egress from a business establishment, (6) the sale of shell from a shell bank, (7)
occasional camping and fishing, (8) the cutting of weeds. Camping for the purpose of
hunting does not constitute such use as to satisfy the limitations statute. Watson v.
Campfield, 432 S.W.2d 184, 186 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1968, no writ); HejI v. Wirth,
334 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1960), rev'd on other grounds, 161 Tex. 609,
343 S.W.2d 226 (1961).
264. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5,510 (1958).

265. Id.
266. Id.

267. See Love v. McGee, 378 S.W.2d 96, 98 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1964, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
268. As against the statutory phrase "other than a deed."

Tax. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.

art. 5510 (1958). If a larger tract than 160 acres is claimed, then a recorded deed is
necessary. Harveys v. Humphreys, 178 S.W.2d 733, 737 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston
1944, writ ref'd w.o.m.).

269. McKee v. Stewart, 139 Tex. 260, 270, 162 S.W.2d 948, 953 (1942).
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described in the muniment of title because the claimant's possession
is presumed to be in conformity with the boundary descriptions in his
deed.27 ° For the claimant to acquire land outside the limits described
in his deed, he must be in actual possession of all the land.2 7'

"Actual enclosure" under the 10-year statute may also designate the
extent of the adverse possessor's claim.272

This method is most com-

monly used by a claimant who fences a tract and cultivates or otherwise

2 73
uses it for 10 years, thus acquiring title to the entire fenced tract.
The fencing must be deliberate 274 and the fences properly maintained

during the entire period. The fence must also be substantial enough
to turn livestock in order to constitute actual enclosure.2 75
Although actual enclosure is only one of the means of defining the
adverse possessor's claim, it is sometimes the only possible means.
When the claimant's land completely surrounds the tract in dispute, he

must fence off the disputed tracts in order to substantiate a claim

against the true owner. 276 In addition, he must use at least one-tenth

277
of the disputed tract for agricultural or manufacturing purposes.

Therefore, even though he encloses the interior tract and grazes ani-

mals on it, this does not establish a valid claim unless he also fulfills
the requirement of use for agricultural or manufacturing purposes.2 78
If the claimant's enclosure does not embrace a substantial part of
the disputed tract, the claimant is entitled only to that part of the land
which he has actually enclosed.270 If the encroachment amounts only
270. McCall v. Grogan-Cochran Lumber Co., 143 Tex. 490, 494, 186 S.W.2d 677,
678 (1945).
271. McCall v. Grogan-Cochran Lumber Co., 143 Tex. 490, 494, 186 S.W.2d 677,
678 '(1945); Henderson v. Goodwin, 368 S.W.2d 800, 802 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1963, no writ).
272. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5510 (1958); Didier v. Woodward, 232 S.W.
563, 565 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1921, no writ).
273. See Didier v. Woodward, 232 S.W. 563, 565 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1921,
no writ).
274. West Prod. Co. v. Kahanek, 132 Tex. 153, 158, 121 S.W.2d 328, 331 (1938).
275. Cox v. Olivard, 482 S.W.2d 682, 686 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972, writ ref'd
n.r.e.). Enclosure was incidental where the fencing was placed back from the deed
boundaries to avoid washout areas and roughness of terrain. McDonnold v. Weinacht,
465 S.W.2d 136, 141 (Tex. 1971).
276. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5511 (1958).
277. Id.
278. Vergara v. Kenyon, 261 S.W. 1009, 1010 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1924, jdgmt
adopted); Vergara v. Myers, 239 S.W. 942, 943-44 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1922, jdgmt
adopted).
279. See McCall v. Grogan-Cochran Lumber Co., 143 Tex. 490, 494, 186 S.W.2d
677, 678-79 (1945); Fielder v. Houston Oil Co., 210 S.W. 797, 798 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1919, jdgmt adopted); Southland Paper Mills, Inc. v. McGathon, 473 S.W.2d 294, 298
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to a few feet, this is usually, as a matter of law, not sufficient notice
to the true owner; however, if the encroachment includes a large portion of the tract, then the question of notice becomes a fact issue.280
Since a claim of right under the 10-year statute requires only an assertion of ownership, it has been held that a naked trespasser may acquire limitation title under the statute.2 81 If there is no instrument of
record describing the tract, and it is not enclosed by a fence, then the
trespasser's claim is limited to 160 acres. 28 2 Where a trespasser cultivates, uses, or enjoys the land and actually possesses a substantial part
of it, there is sufficient notice to the owner of a claim to the whole
under the doctrine of constructive adverse possession. The 160 acres
claimed must include that portion actually possessed and all claimed
2 88
improvements.
The showing of continuous cultivation, use, or enjoyment for 10
years is obviously the most difficult burden under article 5510,284 even
though proof of one is sufficient. Cultivation requires planting and
harvesting of crops for each of the 10 years. The cutting of weeds
or other naturally growing crops is not cultivation sufficient to qualify
under the 10-year statute. 28 5 If the clamant has not cultivated the
land, then he must prove continuous use of it for the statutory period.
The use asserted must be sufficient to constitute actual and visible appropriaton of the land.28a
(Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Smith v. Temple Lumber Co., 323
S.W.2d 172, 174 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
280. McCall v. Grogan-Cochran Lumber Co., 143 Tex. 490, 495, 186 S.W.2d 677,
679 (1945).
281. See Killough v. Hinds, 161 Tex. 178, 183, 338 S.W.2d 707, 711 (1960).

The

claimant can never gain title unless he claims the disputed land as his own, even though
under the 10-year statute it is possible that he would enter and commence possession
without color of title. Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5510 (1958). Color of title
under the 10-year statute is construed to include a void deed or will, and is therefore

different in meaning from color of title under the 3-year statute.

McDow v. Rabb, 56

Tex. 154, 161 (1882).

282. Kirby Lumber Co. v. Conn, 114 Tex. 104, 110, 263 S.W. 902, 904 (1924).
283. Killough v. Hinds, 161 Tex. 178, 183, 338 S.W.2d 707, 711 (1960). In a legal
controversy, the claimant should adequately describe the claimed tract in his pleadings.
See Louisiana & Tex. Lumber Co. v. Kennedy, 103 Tex. 297, 298, 126 S.W. 1110, 1111
(1910).
In the rather special circumstance that the claim is for 160 acres out of a
larger tract, an alternative pleading for a designated and undesignated 160 acres is suggested. Kirby Lumber Co. v. Conn, 114 Tex. 104, 110, 263 S.W. 902, 904 (1924).
284. There is no presumption of a continuance of a claim, the claimant must prove
continued possession for the entire period. There can be no shifting of the burden by
showing possession part of the time. See generally Woods v. Hull, 90 Tex. 228, 229,
38 S.W. 165 (1896).
285. McDonnold v. Weinacht, 465 S.W.2d 136, 141 (Tex. 1971).
286. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5515 (1958).
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The grazing of livestock is commonly asserted as a claimant's use
of the land.

In order for grazing of livestock to constitute sufficient

use, however, there must also be "designed" enclosure; that is, fencing
for the purpose of grazing.2 8 7 If the claimant cannot show that the

fence was built for this purpose, then the fence is only casual or incidental enclosure, insufficient as notice under article 5515. The fact
that the fence enclosing the tract claimed was built by one other than
the claimant weighs heavily against his effort to prove "designed enclosure," even if the fence was thereafter maintained and repaired by
the claimant.28 8

The use of land for outdoor sports is usually insufficient under article
5510 due to the great difficulty in showing the exclusiveness or continuity of the use.1s9 A recent case illustrates this point. In Bramlett
v. Harris and Eliza Kempner Fund,290 it was held that, in spite of fre-

quent use of the disputed land on weekends for hunting and fishing,
and construction of a lean-to and duck blind, the claimant had not
shown visible and notorious possession sufficient to raise a presumption
of notice of the adverse clam.291
Once limitation is matured, it is good title, and cannot be forfeited
through abandonment.2 92 Limitation title is not marketable title, however, absent judicial determination that the claim is valid.2 9 3 Of the
three adverse possession statutes the 5 and 10-year statutes are invoked

most frequently. The 5-year statute is viable only where one is willing
287. McDonnold v. Weinacht, 465 S.W.2d 136, 141 (Tex. 1971); Bridwell v. Long,
508 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ); Georgetown Bldg., Inc. v.
Heirs of Tanksley, 498 S.W.2d 222, 224 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973, writ ref'd
n.T.e.).
288. McDonnold v. Weinacht, 465 S.W.2d 136, 141 (Tex. 1971). The burden of
proving designed enclosure was overcome in Pirtle v. Henry, 486 S.W.2d 585 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.), although the repairs in that case amounted to the
construction of a new fence.
289. See McDonnold v. Weinacht, 465 S.W.2d 136, 141 (Tex. 1971); Crosby v.
Davis, 421 S.W.2d 138, 143 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The same
rule would apply to use for recreational purposes. Fannin v. Somervell County, 450
S.W.2d 933, 935 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1970, no writ). The courts have not distinguished between use and enjoyment with regard to recreational use. Nona Mills Co.
v. Wright, 101 Tex. 14, 23-24, 102 S.W. 1118, 1121 (1907).
290. 462 S.W.2d 105 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [st Dist.] 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
The possession during the first few months of the period did not exhibit unmistakably
an assertion of a claim of exclusive ownership.
291. Id. at 105.
292. Hurr v. Hildebrand, 388 S.W.2d 284, 291 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1965, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
293. See Finger v. Morris, 468 S.W.2d 572, 578-79 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1971,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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to assume the prescribed acts of ownership. The 10-year statute
serves a less meritorious but more common situation, and for that reason, fulfills the valid function of quieting titles long and openly asserted.
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